Oblivious transfer (OT) is a primitive of paramount importance in cryptography or, more precisely, two-and multi-party computation due to its universality. On the other hand, OT cannot be achieved in an unconditionally secure way for both parties from scratch. Therefore, it is a natural question what information-theoretic primitives or computational assumptions OT can be based on.
Introduction
The goal of secure function evaluation-introduced in [Yao82] -is to allow two parties to carry out the computation of a function in such a way that no party has to reveal unnecessary information about her input. A primitive of particular importance in this context is oblivious transfer (OT) [Wie83, Rab81, EGL85] . Chosen one-out-of-two string oblivious transfer -2 1 -OT n for short-, is a primitive where the sender sends two strings x 0 and x 1 of length n and the receiver's input is a choice bit c; the latter then learns x c but gets no information about the other string x 1−c . One reason for the importance of OT is its universality, i.e., it allows, for carrying out any two-party computation [Kil88] . Unfortunately, OT is impossible to achieve in an unconditionally secure way from scratch, i.e., between parties connected by a noiseless channel. However, if some additional weak primitives are available such as noisy channels or noisy correlations, then unconditional security can often be achieved [Cré97, DKS99, DFMS04, CMW04, WW04, DFSS06, NW06] . Most of these protocols first implement a weak version of OT, and then strengthen it to achieve OT. In [Hai04] is was shown that such a strengthening is sometimes also useful in the computational setting.
In this paper we study how a weak version of OT can be amplified to OT.
Previous Work
Various weak versions of OT have been proposed. In most of them, only the receiver's side is weak, such as α-1-2 slightly OT from [CK88] , or only the sender's side is weak, such as XOT, GOT or UOT with repetitions from [BC97, BCW03] . All of these primitives were shown to be strong enough to imply OT. In [Cac98] , a more general primitive called Universal OT -(α)-2 1 -UOT for short-has been proposed, where α specifies a lower bound on the amount of uncertainty a (possibly dishonest) receiver has over both inputs, measured in collision-or min-entropy. Unfortunately, the security proof contained an error that was corrected in [DFSS06] . It was shown that 2 1 -OT ℓ can be reduced to one instance of (α)-2 1 -UOT with an error of at most ε if ℓ ≤ α/4 − log(1/ε) − 1. Weak OT, introduced in [DKS99] , is a weak version of 2 1 -OT 1 where both players may obtain additional information about the other player's input, and where the output may have some errors. It is used as a tool to construct OT out of unfair primitives, i.e., primitives where the adversary is more powerful than the honest participant, such as the unfair noisy channel. Weak OT is denoted as (p, q, ε)-WOT, where p is the maximal probability that the sender gets side information about the receiver's input, q the maximal probability that the receiver gets side information about the sender's input, and ε is the maximal probability that an error occurs. Using a simple simulation argument, it was shown that there cannot exist a protocol that reduces For ε = 0, they gave a protocol secure against active adversaries that reduces 2 1 -OT 1 to (p, q, 0)-WOT for p + q < 1, which is optimal. For the case where ε > 0, they presented a protocol secure against passive adversaries for p + q + 2ε < 0.45. Weak OT was later generalized in [DFMS04] to (special) generalized weak OT, in order to improve the reduction of 2 1 -OT 1 to the unfair noisy channel.
In [Hai04] , a reduction of 2 1 -OT 1 to (p, q, ε)-WOT in the computational setting was presented. These results were used to show that OT can be based on collections of dense trapdoor permutations.
Problems with the Definition of Weak OT in [DKS99]
The definition of (p, q, ε)-WOT in [DKS99, DFMS04] make two additional assumptions that are never mentioned. It requires that, firstly, the players do not get information about whether an error occurred, and secondly, that the event that an error occurs is independent from the events that the players get side information. These assumptions are rather unnatural and in most of the cases where (p, q, ε)-WOT is used, they cannot be satisfied. For example, neither the simulation of (p, q, ε)-WOT for p+q +2ε = 1, nor the application to the unfair noisy channel satisfy these assumptions.
The problem gets obvious in the following example: Even though (0, 1/2, 1/4)-WOT can be simulated, by applying R-Reduce(3000, E-Reduce(10, (0, 1/2, 1/4)-WOT)) (usind the reductions R-Reduce and E-Reduce as defined in [DKS99] ) we get a (0, 0.06, 0.06)-WOT, which implies 2 1 -OT 1 . We would get a information-theoretic secure 2 1 -OT 1 from scratch, with is impossible. Unfortunately, if we remove these two assumptions from the definition of (p, q, ε)-WOT, the E-Reduce protocol from [DKS99] gets insecure, because it depends on the fact that the two events are independent. Directly affected by this problem are Lemma 5 and Theorem 2 from [DKS99] and Lemma 6 from [DFMS04] . Indirectly affected are Lemma 11 and Theorem 3 in [DKS99] , and Lemma 1, Lemma 4, Lemma 5 and Lemma 7 from [DFMS04] , as they rely on Lemma 5 from [DKS99] .
Contribution
In the first part, we show how to reduce one instance of 2 1 -OT ℓ to one instance of (α)-
with an error of at most ε. This improves the bound of [DFSS06] by a factor of two and is optimal. The proof makes use of a new distributed leftover hash-lemma, which is a generalization of the leftover hash-lemma and of independent interest. Our result also shows that in the reduction any 2-universal hash function can be used, and not only strong universal hash functions as in [DFSS06] . We will also present a reduction of the additional parameter β specifies the minimal uncertainty a honest receiver has over the values he has chosen. Our reduction shows that if
the error is at most ε.
In the second part, we will look at reductions of
We propose a weaker definition of (p, q, ε)-WOT and show that the simulation from [DKS99] works for that definition. Using the symmetry result of [WW06] , we show that (p, q, ε)-WOT is symmetric as well and that therefore the bounds for p, q and ε where 2 1 -OT 1 can be reduced to (p, q, ε)-WOT must be symmetric in p and q. For the special case where either p = 0 or q = 0, we show that
secure against passive adversaries. For the case where ε = 0 and p + q < 1, we give a slightly more efficient reduction of 2 1 -OT 1 to (p, q, ε)-WOT which is secure against active adversaries and uses O((1 − p − q) −5 k 2+δ ) instance. Using a different E-Reduce protocol that also works for our weaker definition of (p, q, ε)-WOT, we show that if
instances of (p, q, ε)-WOT secure against passive adversaries. This fixes Lemma 5 and Theorem 2 in [DKS99] , but does not reach the bound claimed there, which was p + q + 2ε < 0.45.
Finally, we will apply these results to the computational case, and show, using the uniform hardcore lemma from [Hol05] , that if there exists a weak computationally-secure OT -an OT which may contain errors and which is only mildly computationally-secure against the two players-then it can be used to achieve OT computationally-secure against passive adversaries, if there exists an informationtheoretic protocol from the equivalent case. In combination with our information-theoretic results, we get a more general reduction than [Hai04] , as we cover a much bigger region for the values p, q and ε, and in our case the security for both players may be only computational.
Preliminaries
δ(X, Y ) is the statistical distance or variational distance between the distributions of two random variables X and Y over the same domain V and is defined as δ(X, Y ) = 1 2
Note that if δ(X, Y ) = ε, then we can always find an event E with probability Pr[E] = 1 − ε, such that P X|E = P Y |E , i.e., the distributions of X and Y are equal, given E. We say that X has a leakage of at most β to Z, if there exists an event E such that H(X|ZE) = 1 and Pr[E] ≥ 1 − β. Note that X cannot be guessed from Z with a probability better than (1 + β)/2, if and only if X has a leakage to Z of at most β.
The conditional 0-entropy is defined as H 0 (X | Y ) = max y log |{x ∈ X : P X|Y =y (x) > 0}|, and the conditional min-entropy as H ∞ (X | Y ) = min y min x log(1/P X|Y =y (x)). A function h : R×X → {0, 1} m is called a 2-universal hash function [CW79] , if for all x 0 = x 1 ∈ X , we have Pr[h(R, x 0 ) = h(R, x 1 )] = 2 −m , if R is uniform over R.
Lemma 1 (Leftover Hash-Lemma [ILL89] ). Let X be a random variable over X and let m > 0. If m ≤ H ∞ (X) − 2 log(1/ε), then there exist a functions h : S × X → {0, 1} m such that for S uniform over S, we have δ((h(S, X), S), (U, S)) ≤ ε, where U is uniform over {0, 1} m and independent of S.
Lemma 1 is also known as privacy amplification [BBR88, BBCM95] , using a different notation.
Lemma 2 ([MW97]
). For all random variables X and Y , and all ε > 0, we have
Definition of Security
Our definitions for the security of a protocol are based on the standard real vs. ideal paradigm of [MR92] and [Bea92] (see also [Can00] ). The idea behind the definition is that anything an adversary can achieve in the real life protocol, he could also achieve by another attack in an ideal world, i.e., where he only has black-box access to the functionality they try to achieve. A very important property of this definitions is that it implies sequential composition [Can00] .
Except in Section 6, we will assume that the adversary has unbounded computing power, and will not require the attack in the ideal model to be efficient. An adversary can either be passive or active. A passive adversary does follow the protocol, but may try to obtain more information than what he is supposed to. An active adversary may change his behavior in an arbitrary way. A pair of algorithms is admissible, if at least one of the two players is honest. In [CSSW06] , information-theoretic conditions were presented and proved to be equivalent to real vs. ideal definition. The following definitions apply to the model with active adversaries. For passive adversaries, we have the additional requirement that the input in the ideal model must not be changed, i.e., that C ′ = C.
Theorem 1 ([CSSW06]).
A protocol Π securely computes 2 1 -OT n perfectly if and only if for every pair of algorithms A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that is admissible for protocol Π and for all inputs (X 0 , X 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n and C ∈ {0, 1}, A produces outputs (U, V ) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• (Correctness) If both players are honest, then (U, V ) = (⊥, X C ).
• (Security for Player 1) If player 1 is honest, then we have U = ⊥ and there exists a random variable C ′ , such that I(X; C ′ | C) = 0 and I(X; V | CC ′ X C ′ ) = 0.
• (Security for Player 2) If player 2 is honest, then we have I(C; U | X) = 0.
We will also make use of a randomized version of
, where 2 1 -ROT n is a precomputed 2 1 -OT n with random inputs. In the full version of [CSSW06] , it was shown that the following conditions suffice to imply 2 1 -OT n .
Definition 1 ([CSSW06]).
A protocol Π securely computes 2 1 -ROT n , if for every pair of algorithms A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that is admissible for protocol Π and for all inputs C ∈ {0, 1} for player 2, A produces outputs (U, V ) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• (Correctness) If both players are honest, then U = (U 0 , U 1 ) and V = U C .
• (Security for Player 1) If player 1 is honest, then there exists a random variable
• (Security for Player 2) If player 2 is honest, then we have I(C; U ) = 0.
If the input for player 2 is randomized as well, we require instead that H(C | U ) = 1, if player 2 is honest.
We will now define three weak variants of OT. Universal OT, or (α)-
Instead of assuming that the receiver does not know anything about one of the two input strings, we only assume that he does not entirely know both of them, i.e., that he has a min-entropy of at least α about both of them. An even weaker version is what we call noisy universal OT, or (α, β)-2 1 -NUOT. Here a honest receiver does not receive the sender's input perfectly, but with some noise, i.e., he has a 0-entropy of at most β over the correct value. Let (α)-
but we require additionally in the correctness condition that if both players are correct then V = X C , and not just H 0 (X C |V ) = 0.
Definition 2. A protocol Π securely computes (α, β)-2 1 -NUOT, if for every pair of algorithms A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that is admissible for protocol Π and for all inputs C for player 2, A produces outputs (X, V ) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• (Correctness) If both players are honest, then X = (X 0 , X 1 ) and H 0 (X C | V ) ≤ β.
• (Security for Player 1) If player 1 is honest, then H ∞ (X 0 X 1 | CV ) ≥ α.
• (Security for Player 2) If player 2 is honest, then we have I(C; X) = 0.
Weak OT is a weak version of 2 1 -OT 1 , where the result may be wrong and where some information is leaked to both players. We will model this by requiring that the three conditions for 2 1 -OT 1 only hold with some probability.
Definition 3. A protocol Π securely computes (p, q, ε)-WOT if and only if for every pair of algorithms A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that is admissible for protocol Π and for all inputs (X, C), A produces outputs (U, V ) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• (Correctness) If both players are honest, then U = ⊥ and Pr[V = X C ] ≥ 1 − ε.
• (Security for Player 1) If player 1 is honest, then there exists an event Q with Pr[Q] ≥ 1−q and a random variable C ′ , such that we have
• (Security for Player 2) If player 2 is honest, then there exists an event P with Pr[P] ≥ 1 − p, such that we have I(C; U | X, P) = 0.
Note that
The difference of our definition of (p, q, ε)-WOT to the definitions used in [DKS99, DFMS04] is that we do not specify exactly what a malicious player may receive, we only require that their output should not give information about the other players inputs, with probability 1 − p and 1 − q, respectively. This means that a malicious players may always receive for example whether an error occurred in the transmission or not, as that information is independent of the inputs. If all inputs to (p, q, ε)-WOT are random, then the security for player 1 can be replace by the condition that X 1−C ′ must have a leakage of at most q to CC ′ X C ′ V , and the security for player 2 can be replace by the condition that C must have a leakage of at most p to U . This means that player 2 can guess X 1−C ′ with a probability of at most (1 + q)/2, and player 1 can guess C with a probability of at most (1 + p)/2.
Distributed Randomness Extraction
In order to get an optimal bound for the reduction from 1 -UOT, we will need the following generalization of Lemma 1, the leftover hash-lemma from [ILL89] . Since this is of independent interest, we present it in a separate section.
We let two players independently extract randomness from two dependent random variables. The (normal) leftover hash-lemma tells us that if the extracted randomness is smaller than the min-entropy of these random variables, then the extracted stings are close to uniform. However, the two strings might still be dependent on each other. Lemma 3 now says that if the sum of the extracted randomness is smaller than the overall min-entropy, then the two strings are also almost independent. Clearly, this bound is optimal.
Lemma 3 (Distributed Leftover Hash-Lemma). Let X and Y be random variable over X and Y, and let m, n > 0. If
then there exist functions g : S × X → {0, 1} m and h : R × Y → {0, 1} n , such that for (S, R) uniform over S × R, we have
where (U, U ′ ) is uniform over {0, 1} m × {0, 1} n and independent of (S, R).
Proof. Let g, h be 2-universal hash-function. Let V = g(S, X), V ′ = h(R, Y ) and U, U ′ be two uniform random variables over {0, 1} m and {0, 1} n . We use the inequality (
a 2 i which follows from Jensen's inequality to obtain
is the collision probability of a random variable X, we have for (X 0 , Y 0 ) and (X 1 , Y 1 ) independently distributed according to P XY and for uniformly random S 0 ,S 1 ,R 0 , and R 1 that
Because g and h are 2-universal hash functions, we have
from which follows that
Universal OTs
In this section, we give an optimal reduction of 2 1 -ROT ℓ (which is equivalent to
The trick behind the proof is to distinguish three cases. In the first case, we can apply the distributed leftover hash-lemma to show that the receiver does not get information about both strings. In the other two cases, we use the (normal) leftover hash-lemma to show that the receiver does not get information about one of the two strings.
We will use the same protocol as [BC97, Cac98, BCW03, DFSS06].
Protocol UOTtoROT(W, ℓ) Let c ∈ {0, 1} be Bobs input, u 0 , u 1 ∈ {0, 1} ℓ be Alice output and v ∈ {0, 1} ℓ Bobs output. Let h : R × X → {0, 1} ℓ be a 2-universal hash function.
1. Alice and Bob execute W, where Bob is using c as input. Alice receives x 0 , x 1 , Bob receives y.
2. Alice chooses r 0 , r 1 ∈ R at random and sends r 0 , r 1 to Bob.
3. Alice outputs u 0 := h(r 0 , x 0 ) and u 1 := h(r 1 , x 1 ). Bob outputs v := h(r c , y).
Theorem 2. Protocol UOTtoROT reduces one instance of Proof. Obviously the protocol satisfies correctness.
Let player 1 be honest. After the execution of W = (α)-
, and A the event that A does not occur. If Pr[A] < ε our algorithm fails if A occurs, which happens with a probability of at most ε. Otherwise, we have H ∞ (X 0 |C = c, Y = y, A) ≥ α/2 − log(1/ε) and H ∞ (X 1 |C = c, Y = y, A) ≥ α/2 − log(1/ε). We choose C ′ = 0. From Lemma 3 follows that P U 0 U 1 |C=c,Y =y,A is ε-close to the uniform distribution, from which follows that also P U 0 |CC ′ U 1 V is ε-close to the uniform distribution. (Note that V is a probabilistic function of C and Y .) From the union bound follows that the error in this case is at most 2ε. If A does not occur, we have either X 0 ∈ S 0 or X 1 ∈ S 1 . Let C ′ take on the minimal value c ′ , such that X c ′ ∈ S c ′ . If the event C ′ = c ′ ∧ A occurs and Pr[C ′ = c ′ ∧ A] < ε, our algorithm fails. This happens with a probability of at most 2ε. Otherwise, we have H ∞ (X 0 X 1 | CY C ′ , A) ≥ α − log(1/ε). Since all x c ′ have a probability of at least 2 −α/2 given C = c, Y = y, C ′ = c ′ and A, we have H 0 (X C ′ | CY C ′ , A) ≤ α/2. From Lemma 2 follows that
with a probability of at least 1 − ε. Since r 1−C ′ is chosen independent of the rest, it follows from Lemma 1 that P U 1−C ′ |CY U C ′ C ′ is ε-close to the uniform distribution. Since V is a function of Y and C, P U 1−C ′ |CC ′ U C ′ V is also ε-close to the uniform distribution. It follows from the union bound that the error is at most 4ε in this case. Let the receiver be honest, and let U ′ be the output of W to a (malicious) sender. From the security of W follows that I(C; U ′ ) = 0. The protocol is secure for the receiver since I(C; U ) ≤ I(C; U ′ ) = 0.
From Lemma 2 in [RW05] follows that our reduction is about twice as efficient in the resulting string length than [DFSS06] . Furthermore, we only require h to be a weak 2-universal hash function.
Noisy Universal OT
Theorem 2 can be generalized to the case where the output of the honest receiver contains errors. 
Proof. (Sketch) Let g(r, v, y) output a value x ′ , such that h(r, x ′ ) = v and P X|Y (x ′ |y) > 0, if such a value exists, and 0 otherwise. Since for a uniform R we have Pr[h(R, x ′ ) = h(R, x)] = 2 −m , the probability that x ′ = x will be at most 2 −m 2 H 0 (X|Y ) ≤ ε.
Information reconciliation introduced in [BS94]
is very similar to Slepian-Wolf encoding, however it is not restricted to one-way communication. Note that the function g is generally is not efficiently computable. However, for many interesting case efficient decoding algorithms are known. For example, if x and y have a small hamming distance the parity check of an efficient decodable linear code can be used, instead of the 2-universal hash function. More information on this can be found for example in [HR05] .
Protocol NUOTtoUOT(W, b) Let c ∈ {0, 1} be Bobs input, u 0 , u 1 ∈ {0, 1} ℓ Alice output and v ∈ {0, 1} ℓ Bobs output. Let h : S × X → {0, 1} b be a 2-universal hash function.
2. Bob choses s ∈ S at random and sends it to Alice.
3. Alice sends h 0 := h(s, x 0 ) and h 1 := h(s, x 1 ) to Bob and outputs x 0 , x 1 .
4. Bob outputs a value v, such that h c = h(s, v) and P X|Y (v|y) > 0, if such a value exists, and 0 otherwise.
1 -UOT secure against active adversaries with an error of at most 2ε, for α = α ′ − 2β ′ − 2 log(1/ε).
Proof. From Lemma 4 follows that the probability that in step 4 Bob can correctly calculate X c out of h c and y is at least 1 − ε. If the sender is honest, it follows from Lemma 2 that
with a probability of at least 1 − ε. It follows from the union bound that the total error is at most 2ε. Let the receiver be honest, and let U ′ be the output of W to a (possibly malicious) sender. From the security of W follows that I(C; U ′ ) = 0. The protocol is secure for the receiver since
Proof of Theorem 3. Follows directly from Lemma 5 and Theorem 2.
Weak Oblivious Transfer
In this section we will look the reduction of OT to weak OT, (p, q, ε)-WOT. The difference to the last section is that now information is leaked to both players, and not just to the receiver. We will try to clarify and correct the results obtained in [DKS99] , give a more detailed analysis, and present some new bounds. First of all, the following Lemma shows that the impossibility argument from [DKS99] works fine if our weaker definition is used instead of the definition from [DKS99, DFMS04].
Lemma 6. There is no reduction from 1 cannot be implemented from scratch, it suffices to show that there exists a simulation of (p, q, ε)-WOT secure against passive adversaries from scratch, if p + q + 2ε ≥ 1.
Alice receives input x 0 and x 1 , Bob input c. With probability p, Alice sends x 0 , x 1 to Bob, who outputs y = x c . If Alice does not send anything, then with a probability q/(1 − p) Bob sends c to Alice, who replies with x c and Bob outputs y = x c . Otherwise, Bob chooses is output y at random. Let Q be the event that Alice does not send both inputs to Bob, and P the event that Bob does not send c to Alice. We have Pr[P] = 1 − p, Pr[Q] = 1 − q, and Pr[y = x c ] ≤ (1 − p − q)/2 ≤ ε. It is easy to see that given P occurs, the protocol does not leak information to player 1, and if Q occurs, the protocol does not leak information to player 2. Hence, the protocol implements (p, q, ε)-WOT.
Symmetry
In [WW06] , it was shown that OT is symmetric, by presenting a protocol that transforms one instance of 2 1 -OT 1 into one instance of 2 1 -OT 1 in the other direction. We will now use that result to show that (p, q, ε)-WOT is symmetric in the same way.
Lemma 7. One instance of (p, q, ε)-WOT can be reduced to one instance of (q, p, ε)-WOT in the opposite direction.
Proof. Let Alice and Bob have one instance of (q, p, ε)-WOT in the opposite direction, and let them apply Protocol 1 from [WW06] . If (q, p, ε)-WOT does not make an error, then the output will be correct, and hence the error will be at most ε. Let P ′ and Q ′ be the events under which their instance of (q, p, ε)-WOT is secure for player 2 and 1, respectively. We have Pr[P ′ ] ≥ q and Pr[Q ′ ] ≥ p. Given that P ′ occurs, The protocol is secure for the sender. We can therefore define Q := P ′ . Similarly, we can define P := Q ′ . It follows that the protocol implements (p, q, ε)-WOT.
Lemma 8. Proof. Let us assume that we have a protocol that reduces 2 1 -OT 1 to (q, p, ε)-WOT. Using Lemma 7, we can implement (p, q, ε)-WOT in the other direction. Then, we can execute our protocol in the other direction. The resulting 2 1 -OT 1 in the opposite direction can be inverted again.
It follows that the region of values p, q, and ε where OT is achievable is symmetric for p and q.
5.2 Special case where p = 0 or q = 0
We will now look at the special case where ε > 0, but either p = 0 or q = 0. As in Section 4, we will make use of known results from one-way key agreement. In [HR05] , it was shown how a weak key can be transformed into a strong key using one-way communication. A detailed analysis can be found in [Hol06] . We will use that result to reduce 2 1 -ROT 1 to (0, q, ε)-WOT. We let the sender play "Alice" in the key agreement protocol, while the receiver plays both, "Bob" and "Eve". We let him be "Bob" for the value he chooses (such that the key agreement protocol ensures that he really gets that value) and "Eve" for the value he does not choose (such that the key agreement protocol ensures that he will not get any information about that value).
Lemma 9. Proof. (Sketch) The sender generates random inputs x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} n to n instances of (p, q, ε)-WOT. The receiver uses his input c as input, and receives an output y ∈ {0, 1} n . For both x 0 and x 1 , they execute the one-way key agreement protocol presented in [HR05] using α = 1 − 2ε and β = q. (We have q < (1 − 2ε) 2 , and hence α 2 > β.) Alice outputs the two output bits U 0 and U 1 from the one-way key agreement protocol. Using y, Bob executes the protocol for his choice c, and outputs one bit V . The key-agreement protocol ensures that V = U C , so our protocol is correct. Obviously, the protocol is also secure for the receiver. Let the sender honest, let M be the concatenation of all the messages Alice sends to Bob and let Y = (Y 0 , . . . , Y k ) be the output of the receiver in all n instances of (0, q, ε)-WOT. Since X 1−c has a leakage of at most q to the receiver, it follows from the security of the key-agreement protocol that P U 1−c |C=c,UcY M is the uniform distribution, and hence also P U 1−c |C=c,UcV . (Note that in the case of a passive adversary, we always have C'=c.) Theorem 4 follows from Lemmas 8 and 9, and from the fact that As mentioned in [HR05] , there exist two completely different key-agreement protocols that achieve the optimal bound. One is similar to the protocol from last section, and the other is similar to the protocol presented in [SV98] , which is based on two basic reductions, one which reduces the error, and another which reduces Eve's information. These reductions correspond exactly to the protocols R-Reduce and E-Reduce which will be presented in the next sections.
Improved bounds using two-way communication. The bounds obtained in Theorem 4 can be improved by using two-way communication. Similar to Lemma 9, we can apply a slightly modified version of the two-way key-agreement protocol presented in [Hol05] . To do that the definitions of the values p and q need to be changed, to match the definition of [Hol05] . So we have to define p eq and q eq to be the leakage of the C to the sender and of X C to the receiver, given no error occurred in the transmission. It can be shown that 2 1 -OT 1 can be reduced to this modified weak OT, if
For p eq or q eq equal to 0, this bound reaches the simulation bound and is therefore optimal. However, this definition would not be useful to the general case, which is why we do not use it.
5.3 Case where both p > 0 and q > 0
If both p and q are bigger than 0, we cannot base the reduction of 2 1 -OT 1 to (p, q, ε)-WOT on key agreement anymore. Instead, we will be using the reductions R-Reduce, S-Reduce and E-Reduce. The R-Reduce protocol is used to reduce the leakage to the receiver, and the S-Reduce is used to reduce the leakage to the sender. Both reductions where also used in [DKS99] . From Lemma 7 follows that R-Reduce can be converted into S-Reduce and vice versa. We will therefore only present R-Reduce.
Protocol R-Reduce(n, W) Let b 0 , b 1 be Alice's input, and let c be Bobs input and y Bobs output.
1. For j ∈ {0, 1}, Alice chooses the values b j,1 , . . . , b j,n−1 uniformly at random and sets b j,n :=
2. They execute W n times, using b 0,i , b 1,i and c as input in the ith execution. Bob receives y i .
Bob outputs
It is easy to verify that these protocols are also secure when our definition of (p, q, ε)-WOT is used.
Lemma 10 ([DKS99]
). The protocol R-Reduce(n, W) implements a (p ′ , q ′ , ε ′ )-WOT secure against active adversaries out of n instances of (p, q, ε)-WOT, where p ′ = 1−(1−p) n , q ′ = q n , and
The protocol E-Reduce was also used in [Hai04] and is a one-way variant of the protocol E-Reduce presented in [DKS99] . It is only secure against passive adversaries.
Protocol E-Reduce(n, W) Let b 0 , b 1 be Alice's input, and let c be Bobs input and y Bobs output.
1. They execute W n times, using b 0 , b 1 and c as input in the ith execution. Bob receives y i .
2. Bob outputs y := maj(y 0 , . . . , y n−1 ).
Lemma 11. Protocol E-Reduce(n, W) implements a (p ′ , q ′ , ε ′ )-WOT secure against passive adversaries out of n instances of (p, q, ε)-WOT, where
Proof. (Sketch) We have y = b c if less than ⌈n/2⌉ transmissions have an error. Since the probability that i transmission have an error is at most
The sender does not get information about the receivers input, if the event P occurs in every instance. Since the instances are independent, this happens with probability at least (1 − p) n , and we get p ′ = 1 − (1 − p) n . Similarly, we get q ′ = 1 − (1 − q) n .
5.3.1
The Special Case where p, q > 0, but ε = 0
We will start with the special case where p, q > 0, but ε = 0. In [DKS99] , a protocol for this case is presented that works for all values p and q if p + q < 1, which is optimal. We will present a slightly optimized protocol and give a more detailed analysis of its efficiency.
instances of (p, q, 0)-WOT for any δ > 0.
Proof. If p + q > v 0 , we apply either W ′ = S-Reduce(2, W) if p > q or W ′ = R-Reduce(2, W) if p < q, and we apply W ′ = S-Reduce(n, R-Reduce(n, W)) if p + q ≤ v 0 , for some constants v 0 and n that we define later.
If p + q ≥ 0.5, then after 2 recursion steps, the value 1 − p − q will be multiplied by at least 1.32. Therefore, after at most −2.5 log(1 − p − q) iterations, we get a (p ′ , q ′ , 0)-WOT with p ′ + q ′ ≤ 0.5, using O((1 − p − q) −5 ) instances of (p, q, 0)-WOT.
If v 0 ≤ p + q ≤ 0.5, the value p + q will be multiplied by at most 0.7. Therefore, after a constant number of iterations, we will get a (p ′ , q ′ , 0)-WOT with p ′ + q ′ ≤ v 0 .
If p + q < v 0 , we have p ′ = O(p n ) and q ′ = O(q n ). Therefore, if the constant v 0 is small enough, we have p ′ < p n−1 and q ′ ≤ q n−1 . If we iterate t times, we get that max(p ′ , q ′ ) ≤ max(p, q) (n−1) t . To achieve max(p, q) ≤ 2 −k , we need −k ≤ (n − 1) t log(v 0 ). So we choose t = c + log(k)/ log(n − 1) for a constant c. The number of instances used is then (n 2 ) t = n 2c+2 log(k)/ log(n−1) = n 2c k 2 log(n)/ log(n−1) = O k 2 log(n)/ log(n−1) .
The theorem follows by choosing n such that 2 + δ ≤ 2 log(n)/ log(n − 1), and v 0 according to n.
5.3.2
The General Case where p, q, ε > 0.
Here, we only have an algorithm that is secure against passive adversaries. We will first look at the case where p, q, and ε are small.
instances of (p, q, ε)-WOT, secure against passive adversaries.
Proof. We use the reduction W ′ := S-Reduce(2, R-Reduce(2, E-Reduce(3, W))), until max(p, q, ε) < v 0 . Then, we apply the reduction W ′ := S-Reduce(n, R-Reduce(n, E-Reduce(2n+1, W))), for some constants v 0 and n that we define later. If v 0 < max(p, q, ε) < 0.02, we have p ′ < 0.7p, q ′ < 0.7q and ε ′ < 0.7ε. Therefore, after a constant number of rounds, we will have max(p, q, ε) ≤ v 0 .
If max(p, q, ε) < v 0 , we get p ′ = O(p n ), q ′ = O(q n ) and ε ′ = O(ε n ). Therefore, there exists a value v 0 , such that p ′ < p n−1 , q ′ ≤ q n−1 and ε ′ ≤ ε n−1 . To achieve max(p, q, ε) ≤ 2 −k , we need at most t = c + log(k)/ log(n − 1) rounds, for a constant c. The number of instances used is
The theorem follows by choosing n such that 3 + δ ≤ 3 log(n)/ log(n − 1), and v 0 according to n.
Lemma 13 is a corrected version of Lemma 5 in [DKS99] . Note that our bound is smaller than the bound in [DKS99] .
Proof sketch of Lemma 13. Let l i (p, q) be a function such that for all p, q and ε < l i (p, q),
, and E −1 ε (ε) is the inverse of E ε (ε) := 3ε − 2ε 3 .
We have also that for all p, q and ε < l i+1 (p, q) 2 1 -OT 1 can be reduced to (p, q, ε)-WOT, since by applying either S-Reduce(2, W), R-Reduce(2, W), or E-Reduce(3, W) we get ε ′ < l i (p ′ , q ′ ), from which we can achieve 
For "extreme" values of p, q, ε, the bound of Lemma 13 is not very good. The following Lemma gives a better bound for these cases.
Proof. (Sketch) It can be shown that for any (p, q, ε) satisfying this bound, after at most 2 applications of some of the reductions R-Reduce(2, W), S-Reduce(2, W), or E-Reduce(3, W), the value 3 √ p+ 3 √ q+ √ 2ε will be strictly decreased. In particular, for any constant v 0 < 1, if max(p, q, 2ε) < v 0 then 3 √ p + 3 √ q + √ 2ε gets multiplied by a constant smaller than 1, and hence only a constant number of reductions is needed to achieve (q ′ , p ′ , ε ′ )-WOT with max(p ′ , q ′ , ε ′ ) < 0.02.
If p > v 0 , we apply S-Reduce(n, W) to get a p ′ ≤ v 0 . Since p ′ = p n ≤ e −n(1−p) , we can choose n = − ln(v 0 )/(1 − p). Hence, we need O(1/(1 − p)) instances to get p below v 0 . For q it is symmetric. If ε > v 0 /2, we apply E-Reduce(n, W) to get ε ≤ v 0 /2. An error occurs only if at least n/2 instance have an error. We can use Chernoff's bound and get ε ′ ≤ e −n(1/2−ε) 2 . Therefore, we can choose
Combining Lemmas 12, 13 and 14, we get
instances of (p, q, ε)-WOT secure against passive adversaries, if p+q +2ε < 0.24 or 3 √ p+ 3 √ q + √ 2ε < 1.
Application to Unfair Noisy Channel. Theorem 6 can now easily be applied to the unfair noisy channel. Using the reduction presented in [DKS99] and Lemma 2 from [DFMS04] , it is easy to calculate the leakages of X 1−C and C, respectively, which can be used as values p and q in (p, q, ε)-WOT. Note since our definition is weaker, we do not need Lemma 3 and 4 from [DFMS04] .
Computationally Secure Weak Oblivious Transfer
Even though the protocols from the last section are purely information-theoretic, we can use them in the computational setting, due to the uniform hard-core lemma from [Hol05] , which is based on the hard-core lemma from [Imp95] . We could take a similar approach as in [Hol05] for key agreement, however the proofs gets much simpler if we use Theorem 7.3 from [Hol06] for randomness extraction, which is based on the uniform hard-core lemma. Theorem 7 is a simplified version of that theorem, where q(w) = 1 for all w.
Theorem 7 (Simplified Theorem 7.3 in [Hol06] be given with are evaluable in time poly(k), and satisfy the following: for any distribution P XZ over {0, 1} × Z with leakage at most β, the output of Ext(Q n , X n , R) is ε(k)-close to uniform with respect to (Z n , Leak(Q n , X n , R)) (where R is a uniform bit string of length s). Then, no polynomial time algorithm A, which gets as input f (n) (w n ) and Leak(q (n) (w n ), P (n) (w n ), R), distinguishes Ext(q (n) (w n ), P (n) (w n ), R) from a uniform random string of length t with advantage ε+γ, for any non-negligible function γ.
We apply Theorem 7 twice to get Theorem 8, which says that if we have a protocol which gives us a weak computationally-secure randomized OT, and an efficient information-theoretic reduction of Proof. First of all, the resulting protocol will be correct, as every outcome of Π satisfies Pr[Y = X C ] ≤ ε. To show that the protocol is also secure for both players, we will apply Theorem 7 twice, once of each player. We will show the security for the sender. We define the following functions: Let R be the concatenation of the randomness of Alice and Bob used in Π. Let f (R) := Z, and P A (R) := X 1−C . Let Π ′ output (X * 0 , X * 1 ) for the sender and (C * , Y * ) for the receiver, and let Ext produces the value X * 1−C * , while Leak is the communication of Π ′ . The security for the sender follows by applying Theorem 7. Similarly, we proof the security for the receiver by applying Theorem 7, but where P A (R) = C and Ext produces C * .
The randomized OT protocol can be converted into an OT protocol using [Bea95] . Together with the information-theoretic reductions presented in Section 5, we get a way to implement computationallysecure OT based on weak computationally-secure randomized OT. A special case has been shown in [Hai04] , where the value of q and ε must be arbitrarily small, and where the weak OT must be information-theoretic secure for the receiver. Corollary 1. Let the efficiently computable functions ε(k), p(k), and q(k) be given, such that ε = 0 ∧ p + q < 1 or p = 0 ∧ √ q + 2ε < 1 or q = 0 ∧ √ p + 2ε < 1 or p + q + 2ε < 0.24 or
